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Washington Law Review
ELECTION

LANW-INITIATIVE

276---THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY

AND

FEASIBILITY OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS IN
WASHINGToN-Bare

V.

Gorton, 84 Wn. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974).

In the November 1972 election the voters of Washington expressed
their dissatisfaction with "politics as usual" and overwhelmingly approved an initiative designed to remedy several deficiencies in the
state's political process.' That measure, Initiative 276,2 is a comprehensive mandate for making public much information concerning
pressures brought to bear upon state and local government officials
and for regulating several aspects of the political process. The Initiative compels disclosure of the campaign finances of candidates 3 and of
groups or individuals supporting or opposing candidates or ballot
propositions. 4 It requires elected officials and candidates for elective
office to disclose the substance of their personal financial affairs.5
1. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 8. 1972, at A5, col. 1. The Initiative was approved by a 3-to-I margin.
2. Ch. 1, [1973] Wash. Laws I, codified as WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.17 (1974).
Initiative 276 became effective January 1, 1973. Id. § 42.17.900.
3. Sections 2(5) & 8, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.020(5), .080 (1974). The candidate's campaign treasurer files the required reports, although the candidate may elect
to serve as his or her own campaign treasurer. Section 5, WASH. REV. CODE §
42.17.050(I)(a)(1974). An initial report of funds on hand is required when the
candidate designates a campaign treasurer (at or before the time the candidate announces publicly or files as a candidate). Section 8, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.080(1)
(1974). Reports of receipts, expenditures and related information must be filed thereafter on the tenth day of each month preceeding an election, on the fifth and nineteenth
days immediately preceeding an election, within 10 days after a primary election
(21 days for all other elections), and at least once every 6 months thereafter if the
campaign organization is a continuing one, or until a final report is made if the organization terminates after the campaign. Section 8, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.080(2)
(1974). Copies of the reports are to be filed with the newly formed Public Disclosure
Commission, see §§ 35-37, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.350-.370 (1974), and with the
appropriate county auditor. Section 8, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.080(1) (1974).
4. Sections 2(22) & 8, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.020(22), .080 (1974). Special
reports are also required from persons making political expenditures of $100 or more
in support of or in opposition to any candidate or proposition. Section 10, WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.17.100 (1974). The reporting dates are the same for committees as
for candidates. See note 3 supra. In addition, § 4, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.040
(1974), sets out reporting requirements to be followed when political committees are
first organized.
5. Section 24, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.240 (1974). The only elective positions
excluded from the reporting requirements are President and Vice President of the
United States and precinct committeepersons. The reports are due within two weeks
of becoming a candidate and annually thereafter on or before January 31: each report
covers the preceeding 12-month period. Id. § 42.17.240(1). The reports must provide
detailed information including the candidate's occupation, employer and business
address; all direct financial interests in excess of $5,000 in bank accounts, savings
accounts and insurance policies; all other direct financial interests in excess of $500:
the name. address, nature and value of such interests; every public or private office.
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Lobbyists are compelled to disclose information concerning their
finances, the clients for whom they lobby and the government officials
they seek to persuade.6 In addition, the Initiative makes most government records, including documents filed in compliance with Initiative
directorship, and trusteeship presently held; and legal descriptions of real property
owned in Washington. Id. § 42.17.240(1)(a)-(/). Rather than report the exact extent
of each interest, the official may report them as falling within designated bounds set
out in the statute. Id. § 42.17.240(2).
In Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911, appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902
(1974), the Washington Supreme Court upheld § 24 of Initiative 276, WASH. REV.
CODE § 42.17.240 (1974), along with other provisions thereof. The court balanced
constitutional interests by weighing elected officials' rights of privacy against the publie's right to receive information concerning its officials' fitness for office. 83 Wn.2d
at 294-95, 517 P.2d at 923. It acknowledged the difficulty of distinguishing between
private and public areas of an official's life, see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
77 (1964), but found that § 24 was not impermissibly overbroad because its thrust
was toward disclosure of an official's financial affairs (which might motivate an improper use of elective office) rather than of more intimate personal affairs. 83 Wn. 2d
at 299, 517 P.2d at 925.
The weakest link in the court's analysis was its treatment of the question whether
the disclosure requirements were rationally related to the public's right to receive
information concerning public officials regardless of the stature of the office sought.
The court sidestepped the issue by finding that it was an "insurmountable legislative
task to tailor disclosures to each of literally a myriad of public posts" and it deferred
to the electorate's judgment in spite of its own misgivings as to the "philosophy and
mechanics" of § 24. Id. at 300, 517 P.2d at 926. Accord, Stein v. Howlett, 52 I11. 2d
570, 289 N.E.2d 409, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 925 (1973); but see Carmel-by-the-Sea
v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), in which the California court struck down a similar disclosure statute for failure to satisfy a rational
relationship test.
6. Sections 15-23, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.150-.230 (1974). Employers of
lobbyists are required to make reports, § 18, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.180 (1974),
as are state agencies and other units of government engaged in activities aimed at influencing legislation. Section 19, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.190 (1974). Certain
"grassroots" organizations devoted to affecting legislation indirectly by influencing
public opinion are also required to report. Section 20, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.200
(1974).
In upholding the lobbying provisions of Initiative 276, §§ 15, 17 & 18, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 42.17.150, .170, .180 (1974), the Washington court in Fritz v. Gorton, 83
Wn. 2d 275, 306, 517 P.2d 911, 929 (1974), found that their purpose was not to
restrict lobbying per se, but simply to provide information concerning lobbying activities carried on for compensation. The court cited authority for compelling disclosure
of information concerning such activities, see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
625 (1954), and acknowledged the public's right to receive information regarding
pressures being brought to bear upon its government. 83 Wn. 2d at 309, 517 P.2d at
931. Finding a rational relationship between such regulation of lobbying and the
societal purpose of preventing undue special interest influence in government, the
court thus upheld §§ 15, 17 & 18.
Section 20, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.200 (1974), which regulates grassroots
political activities, was upheld in Young Americans for Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton, 83
Wn. 2d 728, 522 P.2d 189 (1974). There the court construed § 20 as compelling disclosure of information concerning contributions made to grassroots political organizations for specific political goals, such as passage or defeat of a particular bill, rather
than as compelling disclosure of the entire, membership lists of such organizations,
which would have been an impermissible infringement of their freedom of association,
see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 83 Wn. 2d at 733, 522 P.2d
at 192.
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276, available to the public. 7 To ensure that its provisions are effectively administered and that its civil sanctions 8 are implemented when
violations have occurred, Initiative 276 established the Public Disclosure Commission. 9
Until it was declared unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme
Court in Bare v. Gorton,'° Section 14 of Initiative 276 further regulated the political process by setting campaign expenditure limits for
candidates and for organizations supporting or opposing candidates or
ballot propositions." This note will focus upon the vagueness and first
amendment problems raised by campaign expenditure limitations
generally and the bases upon which these limitations may be constitutionally justified. The discussion will be directed primarily at Initiative
276 and the prospects for future expenditure limitation legislation in
7. Sections 25-34, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.250-.340 (1974). Section 31,
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310 (1974), lists those records exempt from public inspection.

8. Section 39, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.390 (1974). The civil remedies and
sanctions include revocation of registration (for lobbyists), fines of up to $10,000
(or the amount not reported in violation of the disclosure law), injunctive relief, and
even voiding of an election (with a subsequent special election to take its place).
There are no criminal penalties for violating the Initiative, unlike those provided in
similar federal laws such as the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C.
§ 608, 610, 611 (Supp. III, 1973), and the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act,
2 U.S.C. § 261 et seq. (1970).
9. See generally §§ 35-47, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.350-.920 (1974).
10. 84 Wn. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974). Despite the Attorney General's request
that the court limit its holding of unconstitutionality to subsection 2 of § 14, which
was at issue in Bare and which dealt solely with campaign expenditure limitations for
ballot propositions, the court also invalidated subsection 1, which dealt with candidate's election campaigns. In the court's opinion, the voters of Washington were entitled to a holding covering both subsections because of the impending primary and
general elections. 84 Wn. 2d at 387, 526 P.2d at 383.
11. Section 14, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.140 (1974), provided:
(1) The total of expenditures made in any election campaign in connection
with any public office shall not exceed the larger of the following amounts:
(a) Ten cents multiplied by the number of voters registered in the constituency
at the last general election for the public office; or
(b) Five thousand dollars; or
(c) A sum equal to the public salary which will be paid to the occupant of the
office which the candidate seeks, during the term for which the successful candidate will be elected: Provided, That with respect to candidates for the office of
governor and lieutenant governor of the state of Washington only, a sum equal
to the public salary which will be paid the governor during the term sought,
multiplied by two; and with respect to candidates for the state legislature only,
a sum equal to the public salary which will be paid to a member of the state
senate during his term.
(2) In any election campaign in connection with any state-wide ballot proposition the total of expenditures made shall not exceed one hundred thousand dollars. The total of such expenditures in any election campaign in connection with
any other ballot proposition shall not exceed ten cents multiplied by the number
of voters registered in the constituency voting on such proposition.
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Washington; criteria for drafting a new expenditure limitation law will
be suggested.
I.

VAGUENESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT DEFECTS OF
SECTION 14'S EXPENDITURE LIMITATION
PROVISIONS
Despite its earlier benign treatment of Initiative 276,12 the Wash-

ington Supreme Court in Bare v. Gorton13 unanimously invalidated

Section 14 as unconstitutionally vague and an unwarranted abridgment of free speech. 14 The court characterized Section 14 as posing
"intractable problems of administration and enforcement. 1 5 These
problems, illustrated by several hypothetical examples, 16 stemmed

from the statute's lack of specificity regarding readily foreseeable difficulties such as: (1) how accountability shall be allocated, if at all, for
expenditures made by several groups for one candidate or ballot prop-

osition; (2) whether the allocations would curtail communications by
interested parties; (3) where the authority to make such determinations should lie; and (4) what might be done where no such determi12. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
13. 84 Wn. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974). The case was decided only two months
before the 1974 general election.
14. The plaintiff in Bare, a cotreasurer of a committee favoring passage of a local
school levy, sought a declaratory judgment invalidating § 14. Id. at 381, 526 P.2d at 380.
It appears that the City of Seattle's campaign expenditure limitation ordinance
suffers from the same vagueness and free speech defects as § 14. See SEATTLE,
WASH., CODE § 1.21.160 (1958). The ordinance also limits campaign expenditures
made by or on behalf of candidates for certain city officials without resolving administrative and enforcement problems such as those raised in Bare. See notes 15
& 16 infra.
15. 84 Wn. 2d at 383,526 P.2d at 381.
16. The court raised the following seven questions:
(1) Who decides whether a communication is for or against a proposition (or
candidate)?
(2) What effect does the statute have on nonpartisan, "neutral" messages?
(3) Why are campaign volunteers otherwise fully employed or unemployed defined differently so they are subject to different limits regarding how much
of their time they may donate?
(4) What result occurs where the total spent by more than one group exceeds
the total limit?
(5) To what extent may party expenditures be counted against each candidate's
limits?
(6) May a committee over which the candidate has no control pre-empt his or
her communicating by first reaching the applicable spending limit?
(7) Do candidates spend at their own peril in the days before an election when
the potential for overspending is the greatest?
The court found that § 14 failed to answer any of these questions. Id. at 383-84,
526 P.2d at 382.
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nations had been made. The Washington court found that persons to
be affected by Section 14 had "delicate and vulnerable" first amendment rights entitled to judicial protection. 17 Because it lacked the requisite "precision and narrow specificity," 18 Section 14 could potentially chill or abridge the exercise of those rights and was therefore
unconstitutionally vague.
Although the court could have disposed of Section 14 under the
vagueness analysis alone, it also found Section 14 substantively violative of first amendment liberties. 19 While the court did not find campaign spending to be coextensive with political speech, it did recognize that a candidate must have something more than the "bare right
to speak and publish."2 0 It suggested that the exercise of first amendment rights necessarily entails, beyond mere person-to-person communications, some access to mass media. The court found that, because
of Section 14's strict limitation on expenditures per candidate or
ballot measure, one person or group might, through large expenditures, pre-empt all others from communicating, thus curtailing their
21
freedom of expression.
Despite Section 14's invalidation, it is likely that the Washington
Supreme Court would uphold a less ambiguous expenditure limitation
law which established higher spending limits. Because the court did
not equate campaign spending with political speech, it appears that
some restrictions on political spending might be made without impairing freedom of expression. The Bare court implied that the state's
compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process
could shield properly tailored campaign spending restrictions from
constitutional attack. 22 Justice Finley, in his concurring opinion, went
17. Id. at 385. 526 P.2d at 382. The court did not indicate to which rights it
was referring; presumably they are the rights of free speech and association. See Part
I1-A infra.
18. 84 Wn. 2d at 385, 526 P.2d at 382, citing NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415.
433 (1963), and Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
19. 84 Wn. 2d at 386, 526 P.2d at 382.
20. Id. at 385. 526 P.2d at 382.
21. The court hypothesized one person's spending all that was allowable on one
side of an issue, thereby foreclosing subsequent expenditures on the same side. It
noted that in the case of the plaintiff in Bare, one first class stamp equalled the expenditure limit per constituent (10), and that mailing one letter to each constituent
would exhaust the allowable spending authority. While it is unrealistic to contend
that political action groups would use first class rather than bulk mailing rates in these
circumstances, the point that the limit was set so low as to infringe freedom of speech
is valid. Id. at 386. 526 P.2d at 382.
22. Id. at 386. 526 P.2d at 383. The court cited its earlier decision in State v.
Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 94, 508 P.2d 149 (1973), in which it upheld
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further in explicitly asserting that a new statute might constitutionally
23
limit campaign expenditures so long as it set reasonablelimits.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS DEFINED

Because campaign expenditure laws both promote and deter the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights, it is necessary to define
those rights and to consider them in conjunction with the ends which

such laws serve. It is also necessary to recognize that expenditure limitation laws are based upon constitutional interests which must be de-

fined and which compete with the constitutional rights of affected parties.
A.

The Protected First Amendment Rights of Speech and Association

Under modem conditions, the contribution and expenditure of
the state's right to restrict the paid solicitation of initiative signatures on the ground
that the state had a compelling interest in protecting its electoral process.
23. Justice Finley, joined by Justices Wright and Utter in his concurring opinion,
stated:
Nonetheless, while financial expenditures may not be directly correlative with a
candidate's persuasiveness, campaign spending does open avenues of communication which are foreclosed to the impecunious candidate. Accordingly, it may be
deemed desirable to limit the paid communications of the most affluent to preclude the drowning out of less fortunate opponents. This legislative goal may
well meet constitutional muster, as a reasonable limitation on spending may be
justified.
84 Wn. 2d at 388, 526 P.2d at 384 (citation omitted). Justice Finley concluded:
In the interim, the unfettered expenditures of huge sums in political campaigns
may well be an undesirable evil which should be corrected by remedial legislation. In my opinion, the majority's decision does not preclude the enactment of
more carefully drafted legislation which does not so grossly trespass upon the
right of free speech.
Id. at 390-91, 526 P.2d at 384.
The electorate may approve a substitute initiative measure for § 14 or the legislature may, by simple majority vote, enact legislation to replace it, as two years have
now passed since Initiative 276 was approved by the voters. See Trautman, Initiative
and Referendum in Washington: A Survey,- 49 WASH. L. REv. 55, 68-69 (1973).
Several bills have already been introduced this year in Washington's 44th Legislature
to amend other sections of Initiative 276 or to add new election laws. See, e.g.,
H.B. 60 (limiting campaign contributions to those made by individuals or political
parties and prohibiting contributions through agents or other intermediaries); S.B.
2002 (giving force of law to the Fair Campaign Practice Code adopted by the Public
Disclosure Commission); S.B. 2165 (exempting certain elected officials from financial
disclosure requirements); S.B. 2213 (limiting campaigpi contributions); S.B. 2251
(requiring financial disclosure by certain appointed officials); S.B. 2312 (repealing reporting requirements for employers of registered lobbyists); S.B. 2717 (limiting campaign contributions and expenditures and providing partial campaign subsidies); S.B.
2795 (clarifying provisions of the disclosure law); H.B. 827 (same).
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campaign funds are the sine qua non of meaningful political activity.24 Unlike the traditional New England town meeting in which
public officials and their constituents congregate at the town hall to
debate the issues of the day, ours has become a mass society in which
candidates and other political actors must communicate with large
and diverse constituencies. Face-to-face confrontation is the exception
rather than the rule. Therefore, political funds must be spent for media access in order for candidates and others to effectively communicate with their constituencies. 25 A statute which limits such activity
may, to the extent of its restrictions, have the effect of reducing or
26
curtailing political speech, as well as political association.
Freedom of political speech is afforded the highest degree of protection under the first amendment. 2 7 It is axiomatic that democratic
self-government is impossible without the right of the governed to
express themselves with regard to the manner in which they will be
governed. The Supreme Court has jealously guarded freedom of expression in the political context; for instance, in Thornhill v. Alabama
the Court invalidated an Alabama statute which prohibited picketing,
28
stating:
Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press. . . impairs those
opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular
government.
24. See R. WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 18 (1973). A
similar premise is advanced by Winter with respect to political contributions. He
argues that for many contributors, the only effective means of advancing their views
is through contributions to like-minded candidates. Id. at 19.
25. The Washington court recognized this fact of modern political life in Bare:
However, freedom of speech and press involve more than the bare right to speak
and publish. To say otherwise is to ignore reality. To communicate effectively
with the mass of voters, one cannot be limited to verbal communications, person-to-person, but must use the media in one form or another.
84 Wn. 2d at 385, 526 P.2d at 382.
26. Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: Tile
Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REV. 389.
433

(1973);

A.

ROSENTHAL,

FEDERAL

REGULATION

OF

CAMPAIGN

FINANCE:

SOME

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 34 (Citizen's Research Foundation Pub. No. 18, 1972).
27. Professor Meiklejohn forcefully argues:
The primary purpose of the First Amendment is ... that all citizens shall so far
as possible understand the issues which bear upon our common life. That is why
no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from them.
A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 50-56
(1948).
28. 310U.S.88,95(1940).
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In other cases, the Court has protected vehement and racially tinged

expressions of opposition to national foreign policy, 29 reversed a conviction for verbally casting contempt on the United States flag,3 0 invalidated a statute requiring registration of labor organizers prior to
their addressing working people for organizational purposes, 31 and
immunized criticism of the official conduct of a public officer from
32
counterattacks for defamation.
The right of free association, which has been explored in a series of

cases, 33 is entitled to constitutional protection in the political context
in much the same manner as freedom of speech.3 4 Indeed, where
voters make contributions to political campaigns, they are both associating with the candidate or ballot proposition being supported and,
in effect, speaking to the electorate through their contributions to the
candidate or ballot-measure committee. Thus, in the case of contribu29. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
30. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
31. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
32. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The Court commented:
For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open...."
Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added), quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The New York Times rule has been followed in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (public officer rule extended to candidates);
Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damson, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (importance of a free flow
of information in all electoral contests); and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971) (importance of free flow of information concerning any matters of public interest). But see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974) (statute banning political posters from city buses, although allowing commercial advertising, not unconstitutional because city transit system not a first amendment forum).
33. The leading cases in which states were attempting to compel disclosure of
membership lists of unpopular groups, thereby discouraging association with those
organizations, are NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); and Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). Other
cases in which some form of association was found infringed upon include NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (association of Virginia blacks with NAACP to foster equal-rights litigation); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring disclosure of all organizations to which state teachers belonged); and Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (city ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills
without naming the sponsor thereof).
34. E.g., in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the Supreme Court
held that § 5(a)(l)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat.
992, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1970), was overbroad because, in barring
members of Communist action groups from defense employment, it swept within its
prohibition all such members without regard to the quality or degree of their membership. For judicial recognition of the importance of freedom of association for political purposes, see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).

801

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50: 794, 1975

tors, the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of association
35
are intertwined.
The right to associate through political contributions is significant
for many voters because the only realistic manner in which they are
likely to participate in the political process is through such donations
to candidates and issue-oriented groups. When candidates or groups
have been barred from further expenditures because of a statutory
spending limit, additional contributions are made pointless and potential contributors are effectively denied the right of associating with the
cause or candidate of their favor. 3 6 Although one might argue that
those voters could associate with political causes or candidates by
donating their time and services, as a practical matter this is not a
37
viable option for many.
The United States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the importance of money in politics and its impact on the exercise of first
amendment rights. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,38 the Court

held that the FCC's "fairness doctrine," which compels broadcasters
to provide free rebuttal time to public figures, did not contravene the
first amendment. While Red Lion is generally understood to stand for
the proposition that, within the broadcast industry, first amendment
interests are enhanced by compelling broadcasters to offer free rebuttal time because of the public's paramount interest in hearing both
sides of each issue,3 9 it also presupposes that the candidates (or broad35. On the other hand, candidates or committees making campaign expenditures
for their own ends seem to exercise only their freedom of speech.
The right of association protects not only individuals, but also organizations seeking to influence government action. In Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). the Supreme Court held that a
publicity campaign carried on by 24 railroads, directed toward obtaining government
action adverse to the interests of truckers, did not amount to a conspiracy in restraint
of trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Court upheld the railroads' right to associate for a common political purpose, which in this case involved
the spending of substantial sums for advertising. Id. at 138.
36. See, e.g., WINTER, supra note 24, at 18-19: ROSENTHAL, supra note 26, at 23.
37. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (availability of other means
for delivering a message does not justify an otherwise unconstitutional abridgment).
38. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court stated:
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic.
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not
constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
Id. at 390 (emphasis supplied). See also CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 112-13 (1973) (paramount public interest compelled broadcasters, under "fairness doctrine," to reflect differing viewpoints adequately and fairly, but did not
give private groups a right to command the use of broadcast facilities for presentation of their editorial advertisements).
39. The fairness doctrine of Red Lion has not been extended beyond the broad-
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casters) spending money to advance their political interests are similarly exercising first amendment rights.
It is clear that individuals and organizations affected by campaign
expenditure limitation laws have first amendment rights at stake, the
protection of which extends to spending for political purposes such as
media access. 40 Therefore, any limitation of such rights can be justified only as a means of protecting countervailing constitutional interests or compelling governmental needs.
B.

The Integrity of the Election Process and the Right to Receive
Informationfrom All Sources

Despite the paucity of case law on the matter,4 1 there is authority
for establishing expenditure limitations in both the constitutional provisions allowing the federal and state governments to regulate the
cast media, which is considered a "public trust" and therefore due special first amendment treatment. 395 U.S. at 386. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974), the Supreme Court invalidated a Florida statute which required
publishers to provide political candidates "reply space" to respond to adverse editorials. Although the Court did not consider the "fairness doctrine" explicitly, it is clear
that it does not thus far apply to publishers.
40. See note 25 supra.
41. There has apparently been only one state decision dealing with the constitutionality of expenditure limitations prior to Bare. In State v. Kohler, 200 Wis.
518, 228 N.W. 895 (1930), the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in an early application of
the balancing doctrine, upheld legislation limiting campaign expenditures. The
opinion is historically interesting, but the court's now archaic treatment of the first
amendment makes the case obsolete. The court held that to invalidate such an expenditure limitation, the statute must (1) tend to destroy rather than to conserve freedom
of speech and (2) be unrelated to the purpose sought to be achieved. 228 N.W. at
914.
Recently, in Deras v. Myers, No. 23840 (Ore., May 14, 1975), the Supreme Court
of Oregon invalidated two statutes limiting campaign expenditures, ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 260.027, .154 (1974). Applying a balancing test, the court held that the statutes
violated ORE. CONST. art 1, § 8, which prohibits laws restraining freedom of speech.
The court found that, "the limiting legislation closes or impedes important channels
of communication on public issues and thus denies citizens freedom of expression
where the protection of that constitutional right is the most necessary to preserve our
system of government." Deras at 15.
On the federal level there is a similar lack of case authority on point. In Abercrombie v. Burns, 377 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Hawaii 1974),,decided only weeks prior
to Bare, the court struck down a state statute limiting how much a candidate could
spend for media advertising. Interestingly, the court found that such a specific limitation was not necessary, and was therefore an unjustified invasion of first amendment
rights, because the state's campaign expenditure limitation law amply protected its
interests, one of which was promoting equality of opportunity to participate in the
political process.
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"Times, Places and Manner" 42 of elections and indeed in the first
43
amendment itself.
1.

The public's right to receive information and ideas

Modern conditions have made our election process a paradox: On
one hand we recognize that political spending is necessary to communicate, and on the other, we perceive that allowing excessive spending
can impair the election process by discouraging all but wealthy candidates, and candidates with wealthy supporters, from running for election. 44 The election process, which in a democratic society is intended
to be an open marketplace for the exchange of political ideas and information, 45 has become more and more the realm of the monied in-

42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
43. Commentators have also suggested that there is an equal protection argument
to be made in this area. For instance, Professor Joel Fleishman has pointed out that
government inaction may be classified as "state action" for purposes of equal protection analysis under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948). He contends that while elections may be fair in form, they are not
fair in substance because of the great disparities in election campaigns caused by
wealth or the lack of it. In contrast, he argues that all citizens have a right to participate in elections (by voting) on an equal footing, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and that
candidates have a right to advance their candidacies on an equal basis, see Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). Fleishman relies upon cases such as Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), in which the Supreme Court recognized that financial
barriers to candidacy are caused by excessive candidate filing fees, and he suggests
that wealth be treated as a "suspect class," see Harper, supra at 670; Bullock, supra
at 144. On this basis, Fleishman concludes that the courts (and the legislatures)
should assume the affirmative obligation of eliminating financial barriers to election
campaigns in order to achieve equality of citizen political influence by making it
possible for both wealthy and impecunious candidates to compete effectively for
votes. Fleishman, Public Financingof Election Campaigns: Constitutional Constraints
on Steps Toward Equality of Political Influence of Citizens, 52 N.C.L. REV. 349
(1973). See also Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN.
L. REv. 815 (1974).
44. As money becomes more important for effective campaigning, the field of
candidates obviously dwindles. Mr. Russell D. Hemenway, National Director of
the National Committee for an Effective Congress has remarked:
American campaign spending has reached critical proportions. The price tag on a
minimally competitive campaign has soared. We could reach the point at which
all but the rich candidate, or those with rich backers, can be discounted from
the beginning. Money will be the hallmark of political success in America.
Hearings on H.R. 13721 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.,
ser. 57,.at 38 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
45. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 27, at 22-27. Professor Meiklejohn uses the
New England town meeting as a model for democratic government. He points out
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terests. 46 A natural and logical outgrowth of the ascendancy of money
in politics is that the flow of political information has been restricted
in diversity, if not in volume.4 7 Certainly we hear more of the ideas
and issues which attract monetary support; but we hear less of those,

that if all present were allowed to say all they wanted, there would be either unbearable cacophony or interminable meetings; in either event self-government would
become impossible. Thus, he argues that there may be limitations on what may
be said so long as all worthwhile views are expressed. He also argues that we may
distinguish between speech for private purposes and speech for public purposes, affording the latter greater protection under the first amendment. See id. at 63. Unfortunately, Professor Meiklejohn's analysis probably is unworkable as a basis for limiting campaign expenditures; it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine
what "worthwhile" views are and where the dividing line is between speech for private purposes and speech for public purposes.
46. See remarks of Russell D. Hemenway, supra note 44. Campaign costs continue
to skyrocket. Between the 1964 and 1968 elections media costs alone increased by
70%. 1970 Hearings, supra note 44, at 38. The cost per vote in national elections has
increased precipitously in recent years: 1912-1928, 19 to 20 cents per vote cast; 1956,
19 to 20 cents per vote cast; 1960, 32 cents per vote cast; 1964, 41 cents per vote
cast; and 1968, 67 cents per vote cast (including Wallace campaign). Id. at
41. In absolute terms, the cost of all state and federal campaigns has increased
dramatically over the last two decades:
1952
$140 million
1956
155
1960
175
1964
200
1968
300
1972
400
"
(estimated)
H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCES: Two VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL AND

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 8 (1971) (figures are for actual cash outlay and are
not adjusted for changes in the value of the dollar). See generally A. HEARD, THE
COSTS OF DEMOCRACY (1960); D. ADAMANY, FINANCING POLITICS: RECENT WISCONSIN
ELECTIONS (1969); and a series of monographs by H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE
1960 ELECTION (1962), FINANCING THE 1964 ELECTION (1966) and FINANCING THE
1968 ELECTION (1971).
47. Political spending for access to the broadcast media has assumed special significance in recent years. Both governmental and private authorities have reluctantly
acknowledged that greater proportions of campaign spending are going into broadcasting, and that a primary reason for recurring large increases in overall campaign spending is rising broadcast costs. See generally 1970 Hearings, supra note 44.
Congress has been concerned that too much is being spent in political broadcasting.
In the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 47 U.S.C. § 803 (Supp. III, 1973),
Congress established ceilings on such expenditures. The result has been that where
campaign spending is not regulated, candidates with greater monetary resources are
encouraged to rely heavily on the broadcast media, in effect allowing them to monopolize the public's attention and drown out more impecunious opponents. See
note 48 infra. It does not necessarily follow from this that campaign spending should
be specifically restricted in the broadcast area, or that Congress should require the
media to provide free air time to political candidates. On the contrary, all that is necessary is that overall campaign spending be reduced to reasonable levels so that all
candidates may wage effective campaigns. Each candidate should be free to decide
what proportions of the allowable campaign expenditures will be allocated to newspapers, posters, placards, radio, television and the like. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Burns,
377 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Hawaii 1974).
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which, because of their novelty or espousal by weak or dissident interests, are "priced out" of our political marketplace. 48
Yet the electorate has a fundamental, first amendment right to receive a wide and diverse flow of information concerning civic issues
and the conduct of its public officials. Reduction of campaign
spending to reasonable levels will allow voices which were previously
"priced out" to be heard. 49 Still others may be encouraged to add their
voices where before they had been intimidated by the apparent futility
of the effort.
Underlying these assertions is the assumption that the first amendment has a "positive" side as well as a "negative" side. 50 As outlined
above, 5 1 the "negative" side of the first amendment, its "thou shalt not
abridge" aspect, accords certain protection to those restrained by
campaign expenditure limitations. Professor Thomas Emerson has
recognized the basic reason for relying on the "positive" side of the
52
first amendment:
Just as government is now a more formidable foe, so is it a more necessary ally. The breakdown of laissez-faire extends not only to the
economic but to other spheres, and our system of free expression is no
longer self-operating. The complexities of modem society have introd48. A recent example of this phenomenon is afforded by Washington State's lopsided race for U.S. Senator between the 6-term incumbent, Democrat Warren Magnuson, and his Republican challenger, Jack Metcalf. After Magnuson had (again)
swamped all opponents in the primary, Metcalf made some pertinent remarks concerning the pending general election:
We did the whole thing (in the primary) on a volunteer basis ... while the
Magnuson campaign invested heavily in advertising. Maybe it's an impossible
dream that volunteers can take the place of money .... We'd have to raise
$100,000 to be heard.
Seattle Times, Sept. 18, 1974. at A14, col. 6 (emphasis added). Of course, this disparity also reflects the great advantage incumbents have over challengers. See notes
162-67 and accompanying text infra.
49. Professor Rosenthal has concisely expressed the main considerations at stake
here:
First Amendment rights are intended not only for the protection of the persons
who want to communicate, but at least equally for the person who wants to receive the communication. The two cannot, of course, be completely disassociated;
moreover, where campaign speeches and publications gush forth at a great rate,
the continued desire of the audience to receive more of the same may be questioned. Nevertheless, in any weighing of values attention must be given to the
right of the potential audience to hear broadcasts, read newspapers and periodicals, acquire education, and generally "receive information and ideas."
ROSENTHAL, supra note 26, at 22-23 (citations omitted).
50.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 27, at 16-17.

51.

See Part Il-A supra.

52.

T. EMERSON,

(1963).
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duced into the free marketplace of ideas blockages and distortions that
can only be removed by affirmative social controls .... [T] he conditions under which freedom of expression can successfully operate in
modem society require more and more government regulation.

On the "positive" side Congress may enact laws which facilitate or
expand freedom of speech. 53 For instance, in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC,5 4 the Supreme Court placed the public's right to receive
information above the private interests involved: "[I] t is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.15 5 Thus, by compelling the broadcasting company in Red
Lion to provide rebuttal time to the public figure who had been criticized in its editorials, the public was exposed to both sides of the issue,
and the flow of information was, of course, increased.
The Court has also recognized that the public's right to receive information is an essential corollary to freedom of speech. In Associated
Pressv. United States,56 the Court stated:
[The first amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public ....

Associated Press and related decisions 57 affirm the public's paramount
right to receive information and ideas; that right slhould be enhanced
by an effective, carefully drawn expenditure linitation law.
53. The positive impact of the first amendment gives state legislatures powers
comparable to those of Congress to ensure dissemination of information, for the first
amendment applies equally to the states and to the federal government. Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1928). Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court has construed the first amendment and WASH. CONsT. art I, § 5 together to protect
the exercise of freedom of speech. See State ex. rel. Snohomish County v. Sperry,
79 Wn. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (1971). WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5, provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right."
54. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122
(1973) and notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
55. 395 U.S. at 390.
56. 326U.S. 1,20(1945).
57. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing provides
information needed by the public and is paramount to the state's interest in preventing disruptions of commerce); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (public's interest in receiving information concerning the fitness for office of
its government officials paramount to those officials' rights to vindicate defamation);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (same); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265 (1971) (same). Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(New York Times rule not applicable to persons who are neither public officials nor
public figures).
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Regulation of "Times, Places and Manner"

Under the aegis of regulating the "Manner" of elections under Article I, Section 4, of the United States Constitution, 58 Congress has
adopted a variety of laws designed to insure the integrity of elections. 59
Perhaps the strongest language used to construe Article I, Section 4, is
contained in Smiley v. Holm, 60 in which the Supreme Court held that

Congress had authority to enact election safeguards, shown by experience to be necessary, to enforce fundamental rights such as the right
to vote. In Burroughs & Cannon v. United States,61 in which the

Court affirmed congressional regulation of presidential election campaigns under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,62 the power
63
of Congress to protect the election process was made quite explicit:
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation
to safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power
of self-protection. Congress undoubtedly possesses that power, as it
possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments and
58. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1,§ 4, provides in part:
The Times, Places, and Manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof- but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations ....
59. See, e.g., Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368. §§ 302-309. 314,
43 Stat. 1070-74, repealed, Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405. 86 Stat.
20; 18 U.S.C. §§ 602-610 (Supp. III, 1973). Cases upholding such legislation include
United States v. Classic, 3 13 U.S. 299 (1941) (power of Congress to regulate primary
elections for U.S. senators and representatives); Burroughs & Cannon v. United States.
290 U.S. 534 (1934) (statute requiring public statements of amounts received and
spent to influence election of presidential and vice-presidential electors in two or
more states); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (law to protect voters from
intimidation); and Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (legislation to protect
elections for representatives to Congress against neglect of duty or fraud by election
officers).
60. 285 U.S. 355 (1932). The Court characterized the "Times, Places and Manner" language of art 1,§ 4 as:
comprehensive words [which] embrace authority to provide a complete code
for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers,
and making any publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous
requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.
Id. at 366. The language following the semicolon appears to support the imposition
of expenditure limitations on candidates if that is found necessary to protect the election process.
61. 290U.S. 534(1934).
62. Ch. 368, §§ 302-305, 314, 43 Stat. 1070-74, repealed, Act of Feb. 7. 1972.
Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 20.
63. 290 U.S. at 545.
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institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption.

Congress has also sought to protect the election process under the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 by prohibiting political contri64
butions by corporations and labor unions.
Similarly, each state has the power to regulate its own elections
under the reserved powers doctrine which saves for the states all
powers not vested in the federal government. 65 As Justice Brachtenbach noted in Bare v. Gorton,66 the Washington court has previously
recognized the state's interest in protecting the integrity of its elections. In State v. Conifer Enterprises,Inc.,67 the court upheld the va-

lidity of a statute prohibiting the paid solicitation of initiative signatures. The court recognized that solicitation of initiative signatures
was protected by the first amendment, but distinguished the statute
from an unconstitutional ban on freedom of petition by finding that
its narrow proscriptive thrust was aimed at paid solicitation alone.
Because of evidence that the initiative process had been abused
when paid solicitation was lawful, the court found that the state had
a compelling interest in protecting the election process from such
practices. 68 The court added that beyond showing a compelling state
64. Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. III, 1973), prohibits national banks, corporations and labor organizations from making any contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office. While this restriction has been criticized as being potentially unconstitutional, see, e.g., Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 359, 382 (1972), the Supreme Court has on three occasions
declined to decide its constitutionality. See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948)
(§ 313 construed not to prohibit union from endorsing political candidates in its own
newspaper); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (alleged expenditure of
union funds for commercial television broadcasts in support of candidates a violation of § 313, but case remanded for trial where union acquitted); Pipefitters Local
562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (union solicitation of funds from members for its political purposes construed not to violate § 313 so long as donations
were voluntary). In UAW, Justice Douglas would have held § 313 unconstitutional
as an abridgment of the union's right of free speech; he stated in dissent:
If Congress is of the opinion that large contributions by labor unions to candidates for office and to politicial parties have had an undue influence upon the
conduct of elections, it can prohibit such contributions.
352 U.S. at 598 n.2 (emphasis added).
65. U.S. CONsT. amend. X; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (unless
state government runs afoul of a federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the
management of its internal affairs); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967)
(same).
66. 84 Wn. 2d at-386, 526 P.2d at 383.
67. 82Wn. 2d 94, 508 P.2d 149 (1973).
68. Id. at 99, 508 P.2d at 153. The court quoted from Canon v. Justice Court, 61
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interest, the state had demonstrated a necessary connection between
its interest and the challenged statute. 69
Campaign expenditure laws serve to promote more than compelling
state interests. In addition to the justification they derive from the
"Times, Places, and Manner" clause of the Constitution, they enhance
the exercise of first amendment liberties by facilitating a more diverse
flow of political information. Thus, the enactment of campaign expenditure limitations brings into conflict opposing constitutionally
protected interests. The critical question is whether the statutory limitations employed effectuate the state's purposes without impairing the
exercise of other protected rights.
III.

AD HOC AND DEFINITIONAL INTEREST
BALANCING

A.

The Probable Analytical Approach: Ad Hoc Balancing

Assuming that a new statute limiting campaign expenditures avoids
vagueness 70 and overbreadth 7 ' pitfalls, the reviewing court's attention
should be focused primarily upon the question whether the means
Cal. 2d 446, 452, 393 P.2d 428, 431, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 231 (1964): "It is clear that
the integrity of elections, essential to the very preservation of a free society, is a
matter in which the State may have a compelling regulatory concern." 82 Wn. 2d at
97-98, 508 P.2d at 152.
69. 82 Wn. 2d at 99, 508 P.2d at 152-53.
70. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367-78 (1964) (Washington's loyalty oath held unconstitutional for vagueness); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
71. Overbreadth scrutiny is predicated upon the court's perception of a "chilling
effect" on the exercise of first amendment rights which stems from a statute's potential impact. By definition, an overbroad statute is one which covers privileged activity. Typically courts will consider factors such as the degree of overbreadth (i.e., the
presence of a substantial number of impermissible applications), the area of impact
involving first amendment interests, and the availability of adjudicatory alternatives
(such as restrictively interpreting the statute to foreclose overbroad applications) in
deciding whether the overbreadth of a particular statute is fatal to its application.
See Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844
(1970). Often, rather than simply determining whether a statute is overbroad in
its application to particular conduct at issue, the Supreme Court has gone beyond the
facts of the case with which it is immediately concerned to determine whether the
statute is susceptible of improper applications, and has invalidated the statute as
"facially overbroad" if this danger is found present. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611 (1971). However, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973),
the Court may have partially retreated from that position. It appears that the court
has drawn a distinction between pure speech and expressive conduct, requiring a more
substantial showing of "as applied" overbreadth in the latter instance. This may indicate an increased reluctance on the part of the court to declare a statute overbroad where expressive conduct is at issue. See Note, Narrowing the Overbreadth
Doctrine? 45 COLO. L. REV. 361 (1974). Compare Lewis v. City of New Orleans,
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chosen to limit campaign spending are justified.7 2 To answer this
question, the court might use a "clear and present danger" test, 73 a
"first amendment absolute" test,74 definitional interest balancing75 or
ad hoc interest balancing.76 While each approach has its own particular merits and deficiencies, it is probable that the court would rely
415 U.S. 130 (1974), decided after Broadrick, where the Court found a city ordinance "facially" overbroad because it was susceptible of application to protected
speech.
72. The Washington court in Bare, because of its concern for § 14's vagueness and
free speech defects, did not reach the question whether an expenditure limitation
may be justified. See notes 13-20 and accompanying text supra.
73. The test was first used in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919),
and provided greater protection of first amendment rights than earlier tests. See
EMERSON, supra note 52, at 51-53. The accepted definition of the test was stated by
the Court in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943):
"[F] reedom of speech and press, of assembly . . . are susceptible of restricting
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to the interests which the State may lawfully protect." The actual meaning of the test, however, has continually evolved. See
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 27, at 50-56; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1968).
74. The absolute test purports to give full effect to the first amendment by relying on definitions of its terms "abridge," "freedom of speech" and "law" in order to
determine whether a challenged statute is a law which abridges freedom of speech,
rather than by trying to decide on a case-by-case basis whether particular facts justify suppression of speech. Justice Black was one of its staunchest supporters, as is
evident in his dissenting opinions in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134
(1959); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 307 U.S. 1, 137 (1961); and Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431, 438 (1961). See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution,
76 HARv. L. REv. 673 (1963).
Professor Thomas Emerson points out that the test has been subject to criticism
because its proponents disagree over interpretations of the first amendment and because the terms on which it depends have never been adequately defined. Thus the
scope of the test "remains in an unsatisfactory state." EMERSON, supra note 52, at 58.
See generally Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245.
75. Its proponents urge that a definitional balance be struck regarding each
particular type of speech, so courts need not weigh and evaluate each fact situation
anew as is required in ad hoc interest balancing. For example, in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court struck a definitional balance between
first amendment considerations and considerations of personal privacy in holding that
only statements about public officials made with "knowledge of falsity and/or reckless disregard of the truth" could be a basis for an action for defamation. Nimmer,
The Right to Speak from Times to Time, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 942-43 (1968). Simi-

larly, in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), the Supreme Court defined
obscenity by requiring the trier of fact to determine: (1) whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work appeals to
the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3)
whether the work lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. See also
Comment, In Quest of a "Decent Society": Obscenity and the Burger Court, 49
WASH. L. REv. 89 (1973).

76. The ad hoc balancing approach compels the court to weigh and evaluate
the importance of the ends the state hopes to achieve by use of the particular means
chosen against individual first amendment interests incidentally affected. Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). See Fried, Two Concepts of Interests:
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upon an ad hoc balancing approach; not only is the ad hoc balancing
77
method preeminent in first amendment adjudication today, but it
has been adopted by the Washington court for resolving other issues
posed by Initiative 276.78 Nonetheless, a more definite standard of
review is desirable.
B.

A Suggested Definitional Interest Balancing Approach

First amendment absolutists have recognized that certain governmental regulation may be necessary to ensure and preserve freedom of
speech.7 9 Professor Emerson, while suggesting that any restrictions on
the manner or context of expression are, by definition, abridgment,
nonetheless recognizes that a campaign expenditure law may be justified as a means of "purifying the democratic process," if it: (1) is
clearly necessary to correct a grave abuse in the operation of the
system; (2) is narrowly limited to that end; (3) does not limit the context of expression; (4) is a regulation rather than a prohibition; (5)
does not substantially impair the area of expression controlled; (6) has
goals which cannot be achieved by alternative means; (7) can be specified in objective terms; and (8) is reasonably free from administrative
abuse.8 0 Most carefully drawn expenditure limitation statutes will satisfy those standards.
Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755
(1963). Because balancing in the first amendment area by the courts has generally resulted in deference to legislative judgments concerning the statute being examined, the
balancing test has been condescendingly paraphrased as "Don't abridge freedom of
speech unless you think it needs to be abridged." Frantz, Is the First Amendment
Lai?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 744 (1963). Possibly the most damning criticism of the balancing test is simply that it is impossible to
weigh the interests involved other than in a metaphorical sense. Thus, it is argued that
the test merely leads one in a circle back to the question whether the legislative end
is justified in light of the first amendment, which of course was the initial question.
Id. at 748-49; EMERSON, supra note 52, at 54-56.
77. See Emerson, supra note 52, at 54 n. I1; Fleishman, supra note 26, at 401-09.
Fleishman suggests a four-step approach in ad hoc balancing adjudication: first,
the court decides if the rights at issue are presumptively protected rather than absolutely protected or absolutely not protected; second, it evaluates and weighs the particular freedom for which protection is sought; third, it evaluates and weighs the
competing governmental interest; and finally, it attempts to measure the means chosen to serve the governmental interest, by evaluating their negative impact on first
amendment freedoms, their efficiency in serving that interest and their alternatives. Id.
78. In Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 711 (1974), the Washington
court used a balancing approach to assess the constitutionality of § 24 (reporting of
elected officials' financial affairs), see note 5 supra, and §§ 15, 17 and 18 (lobbyist
reporting under Initiative 276), see note 6 supra.
79. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra.
80. EMERSON, supra note 52, at 104-05. Apparently when Professor Emerson con-
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However, Professor Emerson's item-by-item approach may prove to
be tedious and unnecessarily repetitive in application to succeeding
expenditure limitation cases. Likewise, application of an ad hoe balancing approach would require weighing anew competing first amendment and other interests each time such issues are raised.8 1 Rather
than rely upon either of those approaches, the court might attempt to
formulate a more predictable, neutral and principled standard of review.8 2 Judicial definitional interest balancing has been used to produce such standards.8 3 It is worth considering how such a definition
might be formulated.
Because a primary objective of expenditure limitations is to enhance the first amendment rights of less affluent speakers, and of the
public to hear them, by facilitating a more diverse flow of information
and ideas, those rights do not require "definitional" protection. On the
contrary, a definitional approach should focus upon potential infringement of rights protected by the "negative" side of the first
amendment, e.g., the right of people to communicate by spending.
The following definition is suggested as a starting point:
Constitutional campaign expenditure laws are those which do not deny
to candidates, individuals or groups the reasonable opportunity to present their views publicly with an intensity commensurate with the
importance of the position or proposition being contested.
Implicit in the phrase, "the reasonable opportunity to present their
views publicly," is the notion that campaign expenditure limitations
will be high enough to allow most political messages to enter the marketplace of ideas via the mass media. While the phrase "with an intensity which is commensurate with the importance of the position
. . . being contested" is inherently imprecise, it does compel use of a
rational relation test and examination of the political significance of
the office or issue at stake. For example, the definition would require
that a spending limit for the office of governor be (in comparison with
limits set for other elective offices) rationally related to the importance
sidered how legislation designed to "purify the democratic process" might be justified,
it would not fit into his theory of the first amendment. However, recognizing the
importance of such legislation, he carved out an exception predicated upon satisfying

the lengthy list of conditions set forth in the text. Id.
81. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra.
82. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 19-20 (1959).
83. See note 75 supra.

813

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50: 794, 1975

of that office and the size of its constituency. The imprecise characteristics of the suggested standard can be clarified as the courts and legislature become more experienced with campaign expenditure controls.
By adoption of the suggested definitional approach a court would
implicitly recognize the constitutionality of some forms of campaign
expenditure limitation. Having resolved that threshold constitutional
question, and having determined which standard should be used to
evaluate the statutory means employed, the court would be free to
adjudicate the reasonableness of the expenditure limitations. In this
manner the definitional approach would lend greater predictability to
the review process by channeling the court's analysis to a consideration of predetermined issues. 84 Whether the Washington Supreme
Court would adopt such an approach is, of course, conjectural.
IV.

THE MEANS CHOSEN: MINIMIZING IMPACT
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS-A SUGGESTED
FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESS

ON

As with other legislation which affects first amendment rights, there
must be a rational relationship between a campaign spending limita85
tion and the underlying interest it is designed to protect or enhance.
Moreover, such a statute must be viewed in light of less drastic alternatives, 8 6 and must be narrowly drawn. 87 These standards serve to
guide the following discussion.
84. The ad hoc approach, see notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra, has
been widely criticised as inevitably leaving to the reviewing court the determination
of where the balance shall be struck. EMERSON. supra note 52, at 54; Nimmer, supra
note 75, at 939; Frantz, supra note 76, at 747. It is often anyone's guess as to which
factors the court will seize upon although knowing its disposition toward the issue at
hand and recognizing its tendency to defer to legislative policy judgments may provide parties a tentative basis for predicting the outcome.
85. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (no rational relationship
between the state's interest in regulating union organizational activities and a statute
requiring registration prior to speaking to prospective union members). The terms
logical connection, rational nexus and rational relationship may be used interchangeably.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (statute prohibiting
employment at defense facilities of members of Communist action organizations
overbroad because all such members barred without regard to the degree or quality
of their membership); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring
every state teacher, as a condition of employment, to file affidavits listing all organizations to which he or she belongs infringes associational rights protected by the first
and fourteenth amendments).
87. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (statute requiring the
organization to divulge its entire membership list went beyond any legitimate interest
the state had in such disclosure).
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Heretofore, federal 88 and state8 9 experience with expenditure limi-

tation laws has been dismal at best. Virtually all of the older statutes
have contained some sort of loophole, such as an exclusion of "independent committees" from the spending limits, which renders them
ineffective. 90 The most important lesson to be learned from past experience with expenditure limitation laws is that no loophole may be left
without inviting avoidance of the statute's regulatory provisions. Legislatures can expect to injure further their already damaged credibil-

ity9 ' by enacting flaccid statutes with gaps in coverage and escape

hatches for those political interests which oppose regulation, but
88. The federal government has had over 50 years experience with various laws
limiting campaign contributions and expenditures. See Fleishman, supra note 26,
at 403 n.128. For example, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 18 U.S.C.
§ 608 (1970), which had limited political contributions to $5,000 per candidate per
calendar year, was recently reduced to a definitional role by amendment. 18 U.S.C. §
608 (Supp. III, 1973). Another statute had limited campaign expenditures by political committees to $3,000,000 per calendar year for presidential campaigns. Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 609, 62 Stat. 723, repealed, Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-225, § 204, 86 Stat. 10. Both limitations have been susceptible to avoidance,
presumably by making contributions to multiple "independent" committees.
89. See, e.g., Bursten & Bragg, An Examination of the Campaign Expenditure
Limitations Placed on New York State's Legislative Candidates,46 N.Y. ST. BJ. 267,
271 (1974) (footnote omitted):
A pattern of vague, unenforceable and loophole-ridden campaign financing laws
is discernible in most of the twenty-two states that have enacted at least some
laws for regulating campaign expenditures.
A recent listing of states with expenditure limitation laws and their key characteristics is provided in THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 18 THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 1972-1973, at 38-43 (1972).
90. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 26, at 35:

The problem of committees is a particularly difficult one. If the expenses of
the candidate's campaign are paid for by a committee or committees ... supporting him [or her], rather than passing through his [or her] hands, and such
expenditures are not applied against the total permitted to the candidate, limitations upon the candidate's expenditures are worthless. The candidate's managers
will see to it that most contributions are solicited by and filtered through committees, rather than going directly to the candidate ....
New York's experience is typical. That state's expenditure limits, which were unreasonably low, e.g., 100 per voter or a minimum of $5,000 for each gubernatorial candidate, were effective with respect to candidates and committees supporting candidates until repealed in 1974. Ch. 1031, § 455, [1965] N.Y. Laws
2559, repealed, ch. 604, § 18, [1974] N.Y. Laws 891. The statute, however, excluded
committees which supported more than one candidate from the spending limits, apparently on the ground that accountability was infeasible. Not surprisingly, any serious
candidate with money to spend established one or more committees to support his or
her candidacy and someone else's. The committees were free to spend as much as
they could possibly solicit. See Bursten & Bragg, supra note 89, at 269. New York
has since enacted an expenditure limitation statute which appears to cure this defect. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 478 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
91. Government at all levels is faced with a credibility crisis. Washington Post
columnist David S. Broder found that many members of the American Association of
Political Consultants believe that voters are making deliberate decisions not to vote
today. One factor cited for this disturbing phenomenon is the spreading popular be-
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which are often the motivating reasons for such regulation in the first
place.
Because of the dearth of effective models, the drafters of a new
Washington expenditure limitation statute may have to rely upon their
own experience with Section 14, some pitfalls of which were uncovered in Bare. Close attention should also be paid California's recently
enacted Proposition 9,92 which is the most current and comprehensive
attempt at political reform. 93 The reader should be cognizant that the
means suggested below for drafting an effective expenditure limitation
law are not offered as the sole remedy or the "last word" in the area.
They are offered as a distillation of the most current state experience
with such laws and as a basis for reflection and future action.
A.

Control and Accountability of All Political Spending

The first consideration in drafting an expenditure limitation statute
is to insure that it will encompass all individuals, parties, committees
and groups who might make political expenditures. The goal must be
control and accountability of all campaign expenditures. Presently
two innovative paths to control and accountability are in use, one the
so-called campaign treasurer concept, and the other Proposition 9's
94
"definitional approach."
The campaign treasurer concept is based on the theory that if one
individual is appointed by each candidate (or each issue-oriented
committee) and is granted exclusive power to receive contributions
and make expenditures, he or she can be made accountable for all

lief that government is irresponsive to the electorate's wishes. A study showed that
7 of 10 adults believed
the government serves the interests of a few organized groups ... and isn't
very concerned about the needs of the people themselves. [and that ] government often fails to take necessary action on important matters, even when
most people favor such action.
Seattle Times, Jan. 26, 1975, at A12, col. 3. Interestingly, Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, THE HARRIS SURVEY YEARBOOK OF PUBLIC OPINION 10 (1971), showed that
78% of the persons interviewed favored a law which would place an all-inclusive limit on candidate spending in political campaigns.
92. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-91014 (West Supp. 1975).
93. The provisions limiting campaign expenditures for candidates, circulation of
statewide petitions and statewide ballot measures are contained in id. §§ 85100-85305.
94. The term "definitional approach" is used, for lack of a better term, to describe the scheme of defining categories of individuals and groups into which all
campaign spenders will somewhere fit.
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regulated monetary transactions. 95 The treasurer can also be made
responsible for ensuring that applicable spending limits are not exceeded. At least two major problems with the concept arise. First, it
may grant the campaign treasurer inordinate power over contributors
with whom the treasurer or candidate refuses to deal and who are otherwise barred from spending on their own accord. 96 Second, the concept is not amenable to cases of individual large contributors who do
their own campaigning for their favorite causes or candidates.9 7
The definitional approach controls spending by defining categories
into which every person or combination of persons will somewhere fit.
A particular spending limit is prescribed for each category. For instance, Proposition 9 regulates expenditures to support or oppose candidates by setting spending limits for three categories: (1) the statewide candidate, his or her agents and controlled committees; 98 (2)
the state central committees of political parties; 9 9 and (3) independent committees. 100 By definition, an independent committee may consist of one or more individuals.' 0 ' Thus every individual or group
would be included in at least one category governed by a spending
95. See, e.g., §§ 5-8, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.050-.080 (1974), which require
the appointment of a campaign treasurer, compel filing of reports and establish a
scheme by which the campaign treasurer must authorize and record all campaign expenditures.
96. See Fleishman, supra note 26, at 452-53.
97. In Washington, an individual who is not a candidate and who makes expenditures (other than directly to candidates or political committees) aggregating
more than $100 to support or to oppose a candidate or ballot proposition, must file a
special report. Section 10, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.100 (1974). That section of
Initative 276 does not require the individual to appoint a campaign treasurer, and it
is unclear how, if at all, § 14's spending limitation applied to this practice.
98. "Statewide candidate" is defined in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82052 (West Supp.
1975). "Controlled committee" is defined in id. § 82016. Their spending limits are
set forth in id. § 85100. See note 113 infra.
99. The spending limit for a state central committee of a political party is $.01
multiplied by the voting age population of California. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85102
(West Supp. 1975). See note 117 infra.
100. An "independent committee" may not be controlled either directly or indirectly by a candidate or his or her controlled committee, and may not make joint
expenditures with candidates or their controlled committees. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82031
(West Supp. 1975). Any independent committee may spend $10,000, but if it intends
to spend more than that amount, it must file a statement of intent with the Fair Political Practices Commission no later than 60 days prior to the election, and that statement must be approved by the Commission. Statements of intent will not be approved
aggregating more than $.01 multiplied by the voting age population. Where more
than one committee files statements which aggregate above the $.01 limit, authorization will be granted to all of them, but it will be allocated arithmetically so as not
to exceed the limit. Id. § 85104.
101. Id.§ 82013.
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limit. The scheme is essentially the same for statewide ballot mea102
sures.
The definitional approach is superior to the campaign treasurer
scheme because it provides distinct and separate spending authority
for each independent political spender. This, of course, prevents a few
spenders from prematurely pre-empting their side of the issue to the
exclusion of others who would have campaigned on that side but for
the spending limit, an abuse quite possible under the campaign treasurer scheme.
B.

Elective Offices: Scope of Coverage and Spending Limits

1.

Scope of coverage

Determining the appropriate scope of an expenditure limitation
statute and setting threshold spending limits are difficult tasks. California's Proposition 9 is narrow in scope, including only seven high
state offices within its sweep, 10 3 whereas Section 14 of Initiative 276
was extremely broad.10 4 There should be a happy medium.
The most important factor to consider in determining the optimum
scope of the statute is the requirement of a rational relationship between society's interest in limiting expenditures and the particular
offices affected.' 0 5 This can be illustrated by envisioning a spending
limit which would be adequate for a port commissioner, but unduly
restrictive for the Governor because of the substantial differences in
power, prestige and potential impact on society of the two offices.
Another factor to consider is administrative efficiency and convenience. Obviously, the greater the number and kinds of offices regulated
under a statute, the greater will be the demands placed on the admin102. See id. §§ 85200-85203, which set spending limits regarding circulation of
statewide petitions in order to qualify them for placement on a ballot; id. §§ 8530085305, which set spending limits for statewide ballot measures.
103. The only officers affected by Proposition 9 are the Governor, Lt. Governor.
Attorney General, Controller, Secretary of State, Treasurer and Superintendent of
Public Instruction. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 82052, 82053 (West Supp. 1975).
104. Section 2(23), WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(23) (1974), defines public office as "any federal, state, county, city, town, school district, port district, special district, or other state political subdivision elective office." It is questionable whether the
state should be concerned with federal elective offices within Washington in light of
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 4, and the federal supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
It should be noted that candidates for President and Vice President of the United
States are exempt from Initiative 276. See notes 5 supra & 108 infra.
105. See note 85 and text following note 83 supra.
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istrative mechanism. As will be seen in Part IV-D, it is necessary that a regulatory commission be established to resolve disputes
expeditiously, issue opinions, promulgate rules and enforce the
statute. There is a direct correlation between increasing the scope of
coverage of the statute and increasing the size and cost of the regulatory mechanism (or reducing its efficiency).
A "rational relation" standard does not require that different limits
be set for each office. On the contrary, the test would be satisfied if
spending limits were set for categories of similar offices. A general
breakdown might be as follows: (1) statewide elected officials, i.e.,
those elected by all voters of the state; (2) high elected officials such as
state senators and representatives; and (3) lesser state officials and
important local officials. Within each category there could be different
classes to which specific spending limits would apply. For instance,
using the salary of an office as an index of its importance relative to
other offices, statewide elected offices in Washington could be further
classified in this manner: 106 Class A (salaries over $30,000) would include only the Governor; 10' 7 Class B (salaries ranging from $20,000 to
$30,000) would include the Attorney General, the Superintendent of
Public Instruction and the Commissioner of Public Lands; and Class
C (salaries less than $20,000) would include the Lieutenant Governor, the Auditor and the Secretary of State, among others.
Because of the refinement of this system's categories and classes,
spending limits could be set in a manner such that any rational relation test would be satisfied. Beyond the reach detailed, the system
could be extended to those remaining state and local offices sufficiently important to justify the increased burdens on the regulatory
mechanism. Thus, state senators and representatives would certainly
106.

In Washington, the salaries of the state's high elective officers are listed in

WASH. REV. CODE § 43.03.010 (1974).

107. Id. Judges of the Washington Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Superior Courts, whose salaries fall within this category (over $30,000), might be included, but there are good reasons for not doing so. Typically judges need not spend
as much on their campaigns as candidates for the executive and legislative branches
of government. Moreover, judges are nonpartisan. Consider, however, the recent election contest between Liem Tuai, a former member of the Seattle City Council and a
familiar name to Seattle voters, and Washington Court of Appeals Judge Charles
Horowitz. While Tuai spent over $12,000 for his campaign, Horowitz spent more
than $72,000, or almost 6 times as much as his opponent. Of the over $72,000 spent
by Judge Horowitz, $49,000 was contributed by the -candidate himself. Not sur-

prisingly, Tuai has criticized Horowitz for setting a precedent which will discourage
potential candidates who lack such substantial resources. Seattle Times, Dec. 6, 1974,
at C9, col. 6.
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be included, while some county or municipal officials might not. Or to
conform with other provisions of Initiative 276, expenditure limits
could be set for all elective offices for which campaign financing reports are required. 10 8 The ultimate scope of such coverage may be
determined by balancing the marginal administrative costs of an extended system against the marginal benefits derived therefrom, in light
of what the public demands in the way of controls and is willing to
pay for their enforcement.
2.

Spending limits

In setting specific spending limits, legislative drafters must avoid
setting the limits so low as to restrict unconstitutionally the freedom to
give and receive political information, while also avoiding statutory
impotence by setting them too high. 10 9 There appears to be no con-

108. Section 3, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.030 (1974), which requires all candidates to file reports with the Public Disclosure Commission, excludes only the President and Vice President of the United States, precinct committeepersons, and candidates for offices whose constituencies contain less than 5,000 registered voters and do
not encompass a whole county. All others must file the required financial reports. A
"candidate" is defined in § 2(5), WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(5) (1974) (emphasis supplied) as:
any individual who seeks election to public office. An individual shall be deemed
to seek election when he [or she] first: (a) Receives contributions or makes
expenditures or reserves space or facilities with intent to promote his [or
her] candidacy for office; or (b) Announces publicly or files for office.
The problem of determining when a person has the requisite intent to run for office
may raise difficult fact questions. For instance, it is reported that the following Washington politicians have (campaign?) funds presently on hand: Senator Henry M.
Jackson ($932,772), Senator Warren G. Magnuson ($35,784), Representative
Brock Adams ($102,364), and Representative Thomas S. Foley ($25,190). Seattle
Times, Mar. 9, 1975, at A9, col. 8. While Senator Jackson has announced that he is
a candidate for the Presidency, the others have not announced their intentions, if any.
Furthermore, it is not unusual for elected officials to receive "contributions" under the
guise of "A Dinner to Honor
"or other schemes which are not
overtly campaign related.
109. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra. Consider, for example, application of the spending limits set by Initiative 276's § 14 to the 1972 gubernatorial
campaign (assuming that § 14 was effective then, which it was not). At that time
the Governor's salary was $32,500. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.03.010 (1974). Thus, under § 14, each gubernatorial candidate could have spent the larger of:
(a) $197,500 ( 10¢ per voter times the number of voters in 1972 (1.975,000));
(b) $5,000; or
(c) $260,000 (twice the salary per term, each term being 4 years).
The largest sum, $260,000, is appreciably smaller than the limits applicable in some
other states. See note 110 infra. The allowable expenditure would apparently have
applied to the primary and general elections together.
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sensus among the states as to the appropriate expenditure limit,1 1 0 nor
as to the factors material in arriving at the various limits. However, it
is fair to suggest that in computing appropriate spending limits for
particular classes and categories of offices, drafters of future legislation should consider what threshold spending levels are necessary for
dissemination of information to the appropriate constituencies. The
drafters might consider factors such as media.costs, the availability of
free public forums and the potential for using volunteer campaign
help. Data regarding the appropriate spending limits might be gathered by the academic community through empirical research.
Deciding which criteria shall serve as the bases for the actual
spending limits presents another problem. Many states have made
their expenditure limits a function of criteria such as the size of the
relevant constituency"' or the salary of the office sought," :2 or have
simply fixed certain limits without denoting any particular reason for

110.

Compare the following states' expenditure limitations:

(1) Minnesota: Ch. 470, § 25, [1974] Minn. Laws 1169.
Position

Amount

Governor & Lt. Governor
(running jointly)
Attorney General

The greater of 121/20* or $600,000

Secretary of State, Treasurer

The greater of 1 /g€* or $50,000

The greater of 21/2* or $100,000

Auditor
State Senator
State Representative

The greater of 20g* or $15,000
The greater of 20g* or $7,500

*Per capita figure based on total number of voters in each election district.
(2) Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.10 (Supp. 1974).
Position
1st Primary

2nd Primary

General

$250,000
150,000
25,000

$250,000
150,000
15,000

$350,000
250,000
25,000

State House

15,000

15,000

25,000

Other (Municipal)

25,000

15,000

25,000

Governor & Lt. Governor
Other Statewide
State Senate

111.

Proposition 9's expenditure limits are based upon the voting-age population

of California. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 85100, 85305 (West Supp. 1975). There are
several variations of this scheme. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-426 (Supp.
1974) (entire population of constituency); MICH. COMP. LAWS

§ 168.902 (1970)

(number of votes cast in preceeding election); N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 478 (McKinney
Supp. 1975) (number of registered voters); ORE. REv. STAT. § 260.027 (1974)
(same); SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 1.21.160 (1958) (same).
112. Section 14's expenditure limits were determined by selecting the largest of
three amounts computed on different bases, one of which was the salary of the office
sought. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.140(c) (1974). See also Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-347
(Cum. Supp. 1973).
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doing so.'1 3 The ideal is to select objective factors which will accurately reflect the political importance of each office affected. Obviously no single factor will serve that purpose and a combination of
factors will be an approximation at best. Two factors appear most
appropriate: (1) the size of the constituency and (2) the salary of the
office sought. Both factors are objective in the mathematical sense,
viz., being readily measurable, and in the political sense, viz., most
people would agree that the larger the constituency, the more important the office, and the more important the office, the higher the
salary. These factors suggest, for instance, the highest spending limit
for the governor, with the largest constituency and a high salary; a
lower spending limit for the mayor of Seattle, with a much smaller
constituency and slightly smaller salary;"14 and a still lower limit for a
state representative with a comparatively small constituency and a low
1 15
salary.
After determining reasonable spending limits by applying objective
criteria, the final step involves allocating the total spending authority,
expressed in terms of a certain authorized expenditure per constituent,"16 among "defined" groups of political spenders. Thus portions of
the total spending authority would be allocated to: (1) the candidate
(who would receive the largest allocation); (2) his or her party; and (3)
7
independent committees supporting the candidate."1

113. Statutes following this scheme include IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1-30-5 (Burns
Supp. 1974) (fixed limits vary with size of certain voting units); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
3-8-10 (1971) (fixed limits vary with number of counties involved). The trend appears
to be away from such crude approximations of the importance of the offices regulated.
Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-426 (1956) (fixed expenditure limits) with id. §
16-426 (Supp. 1974) (expenditure limits vary with size of entire population of constituency).
114. The salary of the mayor of Seattle is $23,000. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance
92377, Oct. 1, 1963, amending SEATTLE, WASH., CHARTER XVII-I (1958).

115. Washington State's citizen-legislators are paid only $3,800 annually. WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.03.010 (1974). That meager salary is complemented, however, by per
diem allowances which vary with the length of legislative sessions. Because of the variability of the latter allowance, it should not be taken into account as a basis for
setting spending limits; instead, a better approach would be to make the limits functions of the size of each legislator's constituency and some factor of the basic salary.
116.

According to the U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES 381, table 614 (1973), during the 1972 California had a voting-age ( 18
years of age and over) population of 13,945,000. compared with Washington's 2.37 I.000. At the same time California had 10,466,000 registered voters (75.1% of its eligible population), while Washington had 1,975,000 (83.3% of its eligible population).
Id. at 383, table 616.
117. Under Proposition 9, permissible allocations are so structured in California.
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Independent committees present an especially difficult problem
because there is no way to ascertain in advance how many committees
will be formed to support (or oppose) a particular candidate. Proposition 9 constructs a two-tiered scheme to resolve this problem: first, it

sets a fixed maximum spending limit of $10,000 applicable to each
independent committee, regardless of the number of such committees;1 18 and second, it authorizes the Fair Political Practices Commission"19 to grant to independent committees filing timely "statements

of intent" additional spending authority up to an overall spending
limit.120 Thus, under the California scheme, every committee which

is truly independent of the candidate it supports is free to spend as
much as $10,000121 (for statewide elected officials), but beyond that

must "petition" the Commission for additional spending authority,
which will ultimately be limited in the same manner as the spending
authority granted candidates. 122 Obviously lower first-tier limits and
See notes 98-100 and accompanying text supra. In the following table the per-constituent expenditure authorized by CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 85100-85108 (West Supp. 1975)
is based upon the voting-age population of California in 1972, as is the total spending
authority derived therefrom. See note 116 supra. (Note: Proposition 9 was not effective in California in 1972.)
PrimaryElections
General Elections
1972
1972
Per
Spending
Per
Spending
Constit.
Total
Constit.
Total
Governor
$.07
$976,150
$.09
$1,255,050
Other Statewide
Elected Official
.03
418,350
.03
418,350
State Central Comm. of a
Pol. Party (for statewide
candidates)

-

-

.01

139,450

-

-

.01

139,450

Spending in Excess of
$10,000 for Indep. Comms.

118. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 85103 (West Supp. 1975).
119. Established by id. §§ 83100 et seq.
120. Id.§ 85104.
121. Id.
122. Where this additional spending authority is granted, committees on the "other
side" will be given notice of the increase:
If the statement of intent is approved, the Commission shall notify each candidate for the nomination or office in question other than the candidate supported by
the independent committee that the limits contained in Section 85100 may be increased by the amount in the statements of intent filed by the independent committee .

...

Id. § 85104 (emphasis added). This would, of course, encourage committees on the
"other side" to file for additional spending authority of their own. Ultimately, the aggregate of additional spending authority on each side of an election campaign or issue
will be limited to lo multiplied by the voting-age population of the state (in statewideelections). Id.
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lower additional spending authority would be appropriate in a smaller
23
state such as Washington.'
A risk inherent in this scheme is that some candidates will establish
dummy "independent committees" to take advantage of several "percommittee" first-tier spending limits. 1 24 This risk may be minimized
by: (1) setting the first-tier limits sufficiently low to make it politically
inefficient to channel funds through so many small accounts; and (2)
making the candidate and his or her dummy committees subject to
stringent sanctions where such violations are found. 125 A candidate
reckless enough to attempt the "dummy committee" subterfuge invites
opponents to report him or her to the Commission, to say nothing of
the damage which might be done to the candidate's political reputation in the eyes of his or her constituency once the sham is exposed.
C.

Ballot Propositions:Scope of Coverage and Spending Limits

1.

Scope of coverage

Expenditure limitations for ballot propositions pose no special
problems of their own.' 26 There is a natural dichotomy between statewide ballot propositions and other (usually local) ballot measures,
which should be reflected in an expenditure limitation. 2 7 Section 14
of Initiative 276, invalidated by the Washington court in Bare,'28 rec123. Arguably the spending limits set by Proposition 9 are so high as not to be
effective at all. For example, if a candidate for Governor of California may spend
over $2 million in the primary and general elections, see note 117 supra, it is safe to
conclude that each candidate will be wealthy and/or "indebted" to wealthy patrons.
124. See note 90 supra.
125. See note 152 and accompanying text infra.
126. Heretofore, the main concern of the political reformers has been eradication
of the debilitating and unsavory aspects of "candidate campaigns," rather than of ballot campaigns which have drawn comparatively little attention. If, however, the ballot
proposition becomes a more widely used tool for circumventing recalcitrant legislatures.
it will no doubt attract greater attention from those "vested" political interests which
currently devote most of their efforts to persuading legislators and government administrators. Use of ballot measures by public action groups such as Common Cause may
be a harbinger. See, e.g., Initiative 276, ch. 1, [1973] Wash. Laws 1, codified as WASH.
REV. CODE ch. 42.17 (1974) (a broad political reform act sponsored by Common
Cause and the Coalition for Open Government), Initiative 282, ch. 149, [1974] Wash.
Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 512, codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 43.03.010 (1974) (rollback of
sizeable salary increases for state officials).
127. The constituency factor may be the only feasible objective criterion. Unlike
election campaigns, there are no public offices at stake and therefore no salary or "importance" factor to consider. Cf. notes 111-13 and accompanying text supra.
128. See notes 13-21 and accompanying text supra.
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ognized this statewide-local dichotomy. 129 California's Proposition 9
130 It
is more limited in scope and only applies to statewide measures.
does, however, provide independent spending authority for each
committee and a mechanism for increasing spending limits (up to a
predetermined maximum level) where additional authority is requested and is usable. 13 1 Notwithstanding Proposition 9's limited application, its scheme could be readily superimposed over Washington's
statewide-local dichotomy to produce an acceptable expenditure limitation framework.
2.

Spending limits

With respect to statewide ballot measures, all committees supporting or opposing such measures should be permitted to spend up to
a base limit such as that set for independent committees, discussed
previously.132 Thus, unlike the inherent problem of pre-empted
spending found in Initiative 276's Section 14,133 each committee
would be free to spend to its limit without fear of its aggregate expenditures being pushed above the allowable limit because of some
other committee's spending. Any committee desiring to spend above
its limit, i.e., the "first-tier" limit, would be required to file a timely
statement of intent with the Commission and thereafter receive its
approval.1 34 In no case, however, should a committee be allowed to
35
spend in excess of its additional, "second-tier" limit.1
129.

WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.140(2) (1974) provided a fixed expenditure limit of

$100,000 for statewide ballot propositions and a variable limit of 10A multiplied by the
number of registered voters in a constituency for all other (local) measures.
130. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 85300-85305 (West Supp. 1975). Proposition 9
also sets spending limits with respect to the circulation of statewide petitions. Id. §§
85200-85202. These limitations are justified on the ground that circulation of such
petitions may be ultimately as important as later voting for or against them on ballot
propositions. See, e.g., State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 94, 508 P.2d 149
(1973).
131.
132.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85302 (West Supp. 1975).
See notes 118-25 and accompanying text supra. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85302

(West Supp. 1975) allows each committee to spend not more than $10,000 to support
or oppose a statewide ballot measure. Compare Id. § 85104 which sets an identical

limit for independent committees in election campaigns and which allows additional
expenditures upon approval of statements of intent, both for the applicant and for the
opposition.
133. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.

134. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85302 (West Supp. 1975) requires that statements of intent be filed not later than 28 days prior to an election, and that the Commission must
act on the statements not less than 21 days prior to an election.
135. Id. The spending limits may be increased, but may not exceed the lesser of:
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This scheme, with lower spending limits, could be readily extended
to nonstatewide ballot measures. In both instances, the spending limits
should correspond to the size of the respective constituencies to
comply with any rational relation test. 13 6 The administrative mechanism, discussed in the following section, should apply to both election
campaigns and ballot measures.
D.

Resolution of Disputes, Rulemaking and Enforcement

Difficult factual questions, such as whether an expenditure is educational or political, 137 partisan or nonpartisan,1 3 8 in support of or in
opposition to a candidate or issue, 139 or made by a controlled committee masquerading as an independent committee,' 40 will surely arise
under expenditure limitation schemes. Some mechanism must be established to deal with these questions efficiently and equitably. The
Washington Public Disclosure Commission, as presently constituted,
appears regrettably ill-equipped for handling such problems. Its shortcomings stem from the fact it is underfunded, understaffed and underpowered. 14 ' California's Fair Political Practices Commission provides
an instructive contrast. For instance, the members of the Washington
Commission serve without compensation. 1 42 While they may be highly
civic-minded and may strive to act in the best interests of the people,
there are limits on how much can be accomplished when the commissioners must rely entirely upon private sources of income. Under
(1) $.08 multiplied by the voting age population of the state; or (2) $500,000 plus the
aggregate of statements of intent filed by committees on the opposite side of the issue.
Lower limits would of course be appropriate for Washington.
136. See note 83 and following text supra.
137. Professor Ralph Winter describes efforts to disguise what he considers political activity as educational activity not subject to campaign finance accounting. See Sterling, Control of Campaign Spending: The Reformers' Paradox, 59 A.B.A.J. 1148, 1151
(1973).
138. See note 16 supra.
139. Whether an expenditure is for or against a candidate or proposition is an inherent problem in CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 85104 & 85302 (West Supp. 1975). This problem also troubled the Washington Supreme Court in Bare. See note 16 supra.
140. See notes 124-25 and accompanying text supra.
141. It already appears that lobbyists have been circumventing the spirit, if not
the letter, of Initiative 276's reporting requirements by giving indefinite and ambiguous
answers to many of the questions to which they are required to respond. Part of the
problem is that the Commission's staff is not large enough to thoroughly screen the
lobbyists' reports. Seattle Times, Feb. 23, 1975, at A16, col. I.
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.350 (1974). But see S.B. 2795, 44th Legis. § 21
(1975), which would provide $40 per diem for members of the Public Disclosure
Commission.
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Proposition 9, on the other hand, commissioners are fully compen1 43
sated for their services.
The budget of the Public Disclosure Commission appears similarly
inadequate. The Commission has traveled a rocky financial road, beginning with a grant from the Governor's Emergency Appropriation
Fund in 1972, followed by meager appropriations in 1973 and 1974
and a supplemental request in early 1974.144 In contrast, Proposition
9 provides that one million dollars shall be appropriated to its commission each year, and that amount shall be adjusted for cost-of-living
145
changes.
The Public Disclosure Commission has been grossly understaffed.
During 1974 it employed only three staff persons. 14 6 It was their task
to investigate alleged and suspected violations and to process and
screen the more than 14,000 files received in 1973 and 1974. Not
surprisingly, the Commission has proposed that its staff be increased
to 12 full-time employees, not counting the volunteers upon whom it
147
also intends to rely.
Perhaps the Public Disclosure Commission's greatest shortcoming
is its lack of legal and administrative power. Although it does have
authority to subpoena persons and documents, hold hearings and
promulgate rules, it lacks vital adjudicatory powers. 14 8 The latter are
crucial because in a field as fast-paced and as readily transmutable as
partisan politics, an effective regulatory agency must be able to detect

143. The chairman of the Commission is compensated at the same rate as the
president of the (California) Public Utilities Commission, $31,500 annually. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 11551 (West Supp. 1975). Each remaining commissioner receives $100
for each day in which he engages in official duties. Id. § 83106.
144.

See 1974 PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM. ANN. REP. 7 (hereinafter cited as PDC

145.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 83122 (West Supp. 1975).

1974 REPORT). The $443,900 the Commission will expend in the 1973-1975 biennium
is less than 114 of what California's Fair Political Practices Commission will spend.
See text accompanying note 145 infra.
146. PDC 1974 REPORT, supra note 144, at 13.
147. Id. at 34. The Commission readily admitted that until late 1973 it acted as a
mere depository of statements and forms, a situation which has improved since then.
Id. at 13.
148. The duties and powers of the Public Disclosure Commission are set forth in
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.360 & .370 (1974).
149. The Washington Commission has no power to levy sanctions against offenders; it is directed to report "apparent violations ... to the appropriate law enforcement authorities .
I..."
Id. § 42.17.360(5). Appropriate civil remedies, including an
order voiding the election and directing a new election, id. § 42.17.390(1)(a), may be
sought by the state attorney general or local prosecuting authorities. Id. § 42.17.400.
This enforcement process is slow and would often come too late to correct an abuse.
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and investigate violations and, if necessary, promptly convene a
hearing in which it can resolve disputes and levy sanctions against offenders. Washington's Commission lacks the authority to respond in
149
this manner.
Under Proposition 9, however, the Fair Political Practices Commission possesses such broad adjudicatory and rulemaking powers. The
Commission's powers include authority to investigate, either on the
50
Commission's own initiative or after receiving a sworn complaint,1
alleged violations of the Proposition. Where the Commission finds
probable cause for believing that a violation has occurred, it is empowered to hold a hearing.' 5 ' If, as a result of that hearing, it finds a
violation, it may order the violator(s) to: (1) cease and desist; (2) file
reports, statements or other documents or information; and (3) pay a
fine.' 5 2 Commission action is subject to judicial review' 53 and if an
election is pending, the matter shall be given precedence over other
pending court business.' 5 4 The Commission may adopt rules and regulations to interpret and implement the Proposition' 5 5 as well as issue
opinions on which the requesting party may rely in good faith.1 56 In
this manner, a comprehensive scheme is provided for interpreting,
implementing and enforcing Proposition 9.
It is suggested that Washington vest its Commission with powers
similar to those held by the Fair Political Practices Commission, retain Initiative 276's stringent civil sanctions, and provide more adequate funding. A scheme as comprehensive as Proposition 9's should

Moreover, voiding an election is so severe it will probably be seldom used. It would be
clearly preferable to correct abuses of the political process promptly and prior to the
election.
Whatever administrative scheme is finally adopted, it is clear that it will be subject to
administrative standards and safeguards such as those provided in the Washington Administrative Procedure Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.04.010-.920 (1974).
150. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 83115 (West Supp. 1975). The Commission, within 14
days of receiving a complaint, must notify the complainant of the action taken or state
its reasons for taking no action.
151.

Id.§ 83116.

152. Id. A violator may be required to pay a penalty up to $2,000. Compare § 39
of Initiative 276 which provides for civil penalties up to $10,000 or the amount of the
expenditure or contribution the violator failed to report. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.390
(1974).
153. CAL. GOVT CODE § 83120 (West Supp. 1975).
154. Id.§ 83121.
155.
156.
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be adequate to avoid the vagueness and overbreadth problems which
plagued Section 14 of Initiative 276.157
E.

Fine Tuning to Accommodate Political, Economic and Social
Considerations

At least three other factors should be incorporated into an expenditure limitation scheme. 158 First, the appropriate time frame in which
the law is to operate should be specified. Initiative 276's Section 14
was silent on this matter, but Proposition 9's limits are specifically
applicable only during the five months prior to an election. 159 The
time frame chosen should obviously be long enough to include the

usual period of heated political activity prior to an election.
The second factor could be called the dollar adjustment. If proper
threshold expenditure limits are set initially, they should bear the

same relationship to actual political activity, regardless of changes (by
inflation or deflation) in the value of money. If this problem were not
taken into account, inflation would, for example, eventually make the
spending limits de facto restrictive of free speech as the purchasing
power of money declined. Tying the limits to the Consumer Price
Index (CPI)160 or similar indicator which reasonably approximates

157. All of the hypothetical questions posed in Bare, except possibly the question
concerning part-time help, are answered by Proposition 9's substantive and procedural
provisions. See note 16 supra. The part-time help problem could be cured by more
careful definition.
158. Other factors not discussed in this note include rules for allocating benefits to
candidates where several are endorsed in one message and rules for including or excluding interparty communications and other "neutral" activities. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
85105 & 85108 (West Supp. 1975) provide rules for excluding internal party communications and voter registration drives from spending limits. Id. § 85106 allocates
(somewhat confusedly) expenditures incurred in support of more than one candidate.
Washington drafters are well-advised to include a similar but clearer provision allocating such multiple expenditures among candidates and committees, so as to discourage schemes such as were common in New York. See note 90 and accompanying
text supra.
159. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 85100 (West Supp. 1975). There are, however, no time
limits specified with respect to circulation of statewide petitions or expenditures in support of or in opposition to statewide measures. See id. §9 85200-85305.
160. See id. § 82001, which defines "adjusting an amount for cost of living changes"
and §§ 85100, 85201 & 85303, which apply the adjustment factors to the spending
limits for candidates, circulation of statewide petitions and statewide measures, respectively. Section 82001 also allows the state's Director of Finance to adjust the spending
limits on the basis of "readily available sources of information" other than the CPI.
This provision may be helpful where the CPI is not in harmony with changes in media
costs experienced in a particular state.
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the cost of using the mass media 1 61 would solve the dollar value
problem.
The third factor concerns adjustment for the perceived advantage
of incumbent status.1 62 An adjustment to eliminate or at least reduce
an incumbent's advantage and to stimulate discussion of issues, records and policies during the campaign, is frustrated by the realization
that any attempt to determine how much of an advantage an incumbent possesses will necessarily be subjective. Nonetheless, Proposition
9 has attempted to neutralize this advantage by reducing every incumbent's spending limits by ten percent. 16 3 This figure is probably arbitrary and may be unjustifiable. A more practical approach would be
to directly limit, as Washington has done in part, the incumbent's use
of public facilities and other prerogatives of office during election
campaigns. Section 13 of Initiative 276 forbids the direct or indirect
use of facilities of public office, e.g., stationary, postage, publications
and the services of government employees during working hours, for
such political purposes except where such use is part of the "normal
1 64
and regular conduct of the office."'
Unfortunately, neither the Washington statute nor administrative
regulations promulgated by the Public Disclosure Commission adequately define that phrase. As the campaign period begins, or at least
as the election date approaches, individual office holders must attempt
to distinguish between use of public facilities for official communications which constitute part of the normal and regular conduct of office, and personal "politicking" which violates Section 13.165
161. Recall that the cost of access to the mass media is an important factor in
ascertaining the appropriate threshold spending levels. See text following note 110
supra.

162. See PENNIMAN & WINTER, supra note 46, at 2-4. The authors point out that
incumbents have such a pronounced advantage that in no more than 20 to 25% of the
congressional races every two years are there genuine political contests. Moreover, the
financial needs of incumbents are less than their opponents, while their ability to attract
contributions is usually greater. Some observers have argued that rather than incumbents being "bought" by big contributors, big contributions naturally flow to a candidate who is perceived to be a "winner." See Fleishman, supra note 43, at 458; see also
note 48 supra.
163. CAL. GOV'TCODE § 85 101 (West Supp. 1975).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.130 (1974). See also WASH. AD. CODE § 390-04040(1973).
165. Recently, two members of the Seattle City Council were reprimanded for distributing press releases urging voters to oppose a ballot proposition which, if approved,
would have allowed aviation at Sand Point, a city park. City funds ($24.20) had
been spent for the releases. The two members announced that they would make "some
kind of challenge" of the Public Disclosure Commission's finding as they believed
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S.B. 2717, currently before the Washington State Legislature,
would more specifically restrict an incumbent's use of office by limiting
state appropriations to legislators for mail communications to $1,000
annually and by prohibiting mass mailings within a period of 150
days prior to an election without the permission of the Public Disclosure Commission.1 66 Obviously, these remedies will not completely
neutralize an incumbent's advantage; that is probably impossible.
They will, however, mitigate or eliminate the unfair use of public office facilities and personnel, which would be a major accomplishment.167
V.

CONCLUSION

Each citizen has the right to exercise his or her freedoms of speech
and association through candidacy or support of another candidate or
cause. At the same time, the government and the electorate have the
power to protect the electoral process and to insure that freedom of
speech is fully realized in a wide and diverse flow of information concerning public affairs. To affect these ends, society may establish laws
which place reasonable limits on campaign spending.
Drafting an effective, yet constitutional, campaign expenditure limitation statute poses substantial problems. The prospects for success
are not overwhelming. Critics of expenditure limitation suggest expe169
rience has shown it to be ineffective, 168 of doubtful constitutionality
that their action was within the order of business in which elected officials may lawfully conduct themselves. They defended their action on the grounds that the Mayor
and the Council had for 3 years opposed aviation at Sand Point and that the city attorney had advised them that they could lawfully make statements concerning public
issues. Seattle Times, Apr. 18, 1975, at A4, col. 1. This episode demonstrates that § 13
of Initiative 276 sorely needs clarification.
166.

See S.B. 2717 (H.B. 828), 44thLegis. § 7 (1975).

167. For an impressive list of monetary and nonmonetary benefits provided to legislators as 'part of their office budgets and official privileges, see, e.g., PENNIMAN&
WINTER, supranote 46, at 17.
168. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 17 (1962); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FINANCING A
BETTER ELECTION SYSTEM 51-53 (1968); MODEL STATE CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION AND

EXPENDITURES REPORTING LAW 2 (1961).
Florida provides one of the longest and best documented state experiences with
campaign expenditure limitations. An ancient statute, ch. 6470, [1913] Fla. Laws 268,
set campaign expenditure limits, but was repealed in 1949 as unworkable. Ch. 25273,
[1949] Fla. Laws 637. It was replaced in 1951 by the Florida Revised Election Code,
ch. 26819, §§ 1-11, 13, [1951] Fla. Laws 631 and ch. 26870, § 3, [1951] Fla. Laws
816, which among other things provided for disclosure of political contributions and
expenditures. Some observers believed that Florida had achieved considerable success
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and even philosophically unsound because the political process should
respond to the preferences of those individuals willing to pay for their
political views. 170 The most interesting and constructive criticism of
spending limits has been advanced by Professor Joel Fleishman in an
article suggesting government subsidies as the best means of reme17
dying abuses of the electoral process. 1
Fleishman argues that government subsidies, coupled with a complete ban on private campaign expenditures will reduce spending to
reasonable levels and remove from politics the deleterious effects of
private spending. He objects to reliance on spending limits alone, reasoning that the mere existence of any private spending insures that the
potential for covert political purchase will remain a part of our political system.
While Fleishman's criticism has considerable merit with regard to
federal elections where total subsidies are realistically conceivable, it
is not as readily applicable to the states which are, even if willing,
probably unable to completely subsidize campaigns. Therefore, at the
state level other combinations of remedies are more appropriate. Such
remedies, in addition to campaign expenditure limitations, include
limitations on contributions, disclosure laws and partial subsidies. The
primary function of contribution limitations is to keep political "fat
cats" from gaining undue influence with candidates for office by
bankrolling their campaigns.1 72 The disclosure laws complement the
under its 1951 disclosure provisions alone. See Roady, Ten Years of Florida's "Who
Gave It--Who Got It" Law, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 434 (1962). The Florida disclosure statute was upheld against constitutional attack in Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d
166 (Fla. 1953). However, Florida has again changed course, repealing its 1951 Revised Election Code, ch. 73-128, § 32, [1973] Fla. Laws 210, and enacting new
election laws which include an expenditure limitation statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.10
(Supp. 1974) and note 110 Yupra.
169. It is argued that expenditure limitation laws directly limit how much may be
spent "in speaking" to the 'public, and therefore inevitably infringe freedom of speech
in violation of the first amendment. It is also argued that a prominent effect of such
limitations is impairment of the associational rights of contributors. See Part II-A
supra.
170. See Sterling, Control of Campaign Spending: The Reformers' Paradox, 59
A.B.A.J. 1148, 1153 (1973).
171. Fleishman. supra note 43, at 413. Full discussion of the campaign subsidy
scheme, and the equal protection argument on which it is based (see note 43 supra).
is beyond the scope of this note.
172. The federal government has for some time had a loophole-ridden law. 18
U.S.C. § 608 (1970), limiting contributions to Presidential or Congressional campaigns
to $5,000 per year. The recent Watergate expose has clearly demonstrated that provision is easily circumvented by contributing to many committees supporting the same
candidate. See generally ROSENTHAL, supra note 26. at 21; WINTER, supra note 24, at
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other election laws by bringing to the attention of the press, and thereby the public, conflicts of interest and other improper political activities.137 3 Partial subsidies, where feasible, help to defray the currently
high cost of politics, but in the absence of expenditure limitations will
serve only to raise aggregate spending without reducing the advantages
to candidates with substantial resources of their own.17 4
A complete effort to remedy deficiencies in the political process
would include all or most of these types of laws. Washington presently
has a broad disclosure statute175 and several bills have been introduced in the legislature to enact contribution limitations and partial
campaign subsidies.' 7 6 The missing component is a constitutional
expenditure limitation statute. It is a vital element of the total scheme
because it alone most effectively removes inequitable distribution of
wealth from its longstanding position at the head of the list of requisite political assets. A salutory result of implementing an effective
campaign expenditure limitation would be that other qualities such as
"candidates' comparative integrity, honesty, vision, intelligence, courage, charisma, and creativity"1 77 would play a larger role in our political process.
Parry Grover

18; Comment, The Constitutionality of Restrictions of Individual Contributions to
Candidatesin Federal Elections, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (1974).

173.

Most states have some type of public disclosure law. For a recent listing and

classification of such laws, see Note, The Constitutionality of Financial Disclosure
Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 345 (1974).
174. For good discussions of the practicality and constitutionality of subsidies in
general, see Fleishman, supra note 43, at 383; ROSENTHAL, supra note 26, at 53-61.
175. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.030-.130, .150-.240 (1974) (disclosure provisions

of Initiative 276). In addition, a bill has been introduced in the 44th Legislature to
compel financing disclosure by certain appointed officials. S.B. 2251. Other disclosure
bills introduced in 1975 include S.B. 2371 (changing financial disclosure law and
providing for annual publication of all elected officials finances); S.B. 2435 (further
defining words used in the public disclosure law and changing reporting requirements
for lobbyists' employers); S.B. 2312 (repealing section of Initiative 276 requiring reports by employers of registered lobbyists); and H.B. 555 (eliminating requirement
that a verified statement of contributions and contributors be filed with an initiative or

referendum).
176. S.B. 2213 and H.B. 60 would place certain limitations on campaign contributions and H.B. 709 would provide partial public funding for the governor's and
lieutenant governor's election campaigns. A more comprehensive bill, drafted by Com-

mon Cause, would limit campaign contributions and expenditures, provide partial
subsidies, limit utilization of mass mailings by incumbents and provide stiffer penalties for violations. See S.B. 2717 and H.B. 828.
177.

Fleishman, supra note 43, at 349.
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